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Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA t
Joel R. Reidenberg"
The two excellent papers we just heard pose quite a challenge
for a commentator at the end of a long and intense day. Rather
than attempting to expand on the interesting statements made by
Professor Reichman and Emery Simon about intellectual property
rights, I would like to talk about what the two speakers did not say.
Namely, I will highlight the significance of bringing intellectual
property issues into the trade arena.
A few key points illustrate the significance. First, placing intellectual property protection in the trade framework has important
implications for the use of trade sanctions. Second, the incorporation in GATT TRIPS' and NAFTA 2 of traditional intellectual property rights adds an inherent tension to trade relations, particularly
for new technologies. And finally, because of the tension, intellectual property issues may increasingly drive GATT members to
form regional and bilateral intellectual property arrangements.
While the expansion of intellectual property protection around
the world can be attributed to American trade pressure, the trade
framework will constrain any country's ability to take unilateral
measures against infringements of intellectual property rights. The
TRIPS text and NAFTA will set basic minimum standards for protection of intellectual property. If, following the entry into force
I This panel commentary was presented at the Fordham International Intellectual
Property Law and Policy Conference held at the Fordham University School of Law on
April 15, 1993.
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Dartmouth College, B.A.;
Columbia Law School, J.D.; University de Paris I (Panthdon-Sorbonne), D.E.A.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade In Counterfeit Goods (Annex III).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Extra File, NAFTA.

284

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 4:171

of these international codes, a signatory lacks protection, the trade
agreements will require that any dispute over the compliance of
national law to the treaty standards, whether those disputes arise in
a North-North or North-South context, be resolved through the
multilateral GATT panel process or the NAFTA arbitration mechanism rather than through unilateral action.
This multilateralism may cause particular difficulties for the
United States. In the last few years, the United States has taken
unilateral action under sections 3373 and 3014 of the U.S. trade law
to block the import of patent infringing products and to sanction
countries that did not adequately protect American intellectual
property. A GATT Panel has already ruled that section 337 violates existing U.S. obligations under the GATT.5 With the addition
of the TRIPS code, section 301 may also be challenged as contrary
to the new GATT obligations. Because the final GATT and
NAFTA texts will necessarily contain compromises on substantive
standards, American industry is likely to have objections to at least
some of the negotiated outcome for intellectual property rights.
And, if national implementation of new intellectual property standards is insufficient, the gains may lose a great degree of their
value.
Should the United States not be satisfied with foreign intellectual property protection, the risk to international trade of continuing
unilateral action under GATT and under NAFTA is increased. If
the United States imposes intellectual property sanctions outside the
treaty framework, cross-sectoral retaliation may be permitted. For
example, if the United States continues to act under section 337 or
sanctions a country under section 301, the harmed country may be
permitted under GATT to impose sanctions against the United
States in another area, such as the withdrawal of new foreign investment protections.

3. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
4. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
5. See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report by the Panel
Adopted on 7 November 1989 (L/6439), GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE:
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 345, 345-402 (36th Supp. 1990).
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GA7T AND NAFTA

While these implications of including intellectual property
rights in a trade framework may not have been carefully thought
out, the constraints on unilateral sanctions are, of course, not without benefit. As Emery Simon noted, the trade negotiations have
helped to spread intellectual property rights around the world.
In spreading intellectual property rights, the trade negotiations
are, however, setting up an inherent tension, particularly in TRIPS.
The trade negotiations focus on traditional forms of intellectual
property protection. For example, TRIPS will require signatories
to enact basic copyright protection. Yet, as Professor Reichman
pointed out earlier, there are many problems with the form and
scope of copyright protection for new technologies and applied
scientific know-how. The traditional rights now being enshrined
in TRIPS are also at odds with emerging national trends. New
technologies do not fit neatly within traditional forms of intellectual
property. Although in the United States, copyright law is generally
used to protect software and databases, the protections are, in effect, struggling to achieve sui generis forms of protection. The
"look and feel" and "sweat of the brow" issues went beyond the
traditional scope of copyright. Elsewhere, sui generis rights are
also emerging for intellectual property, such as semiconductor chip
protection and the European Community's proposed database extraction right.
By focusing on the traditional forms of protection at the same
time, these protections are pressured to move in a sui generis direction, we may have defined some rights, but have left significant
gaps for the scope of protection. Neither TRIPS nor NAFTA go
very far in articulating standards for the scope of each new international intellectual property right. As Emery Simon noted, this may
be better than nothing. Yet, these gaps are a major problem for
effective international protection, especially for information technologies. National differences in the scope of protection will exist
rather than an "all or nothing" regulatory framework. These differences in scope are likely to challenge the fundamental trade principles limiting the imposition of unilateral sanctions. The United
States and other intellectual property producing countries will most
likely face domestic pressures to sanction countries that do not
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extend the scope of protection as far as the intellectual property
producing country.
This pressure is likely to push a second generation in the evolution of intellectual property rights in a trade environment. The
TRIPS text provides in Article IV for most-favored-nation treatment, but does not spell out the relationship to Article XXIV of the
GATT, the provision on free trade areas. This suggests that we
may see interesting movements toward intellectual property free
trade areas. Once the basic rights are established in TRIPS, the
combination of differences in the scope of protection, political
pressure for sanctions, and limits on unilateral action are likely to
encourage countries to seek free-trade areas defined by uniform
standards. In other words, countries may try to deal with second
generation intellectual property issues outside the broad multilateral
framework. The timing sequence of NAFTA and TRIPS should
not go unnoticed; it illustrates this point.
To conclude, I would just like to reiterate comments that Emery
Simon and Professor Reichman made earlier. As Emery Simon
said, including at least the traditional intellectual property rights in
the trade treaties is better than what we had before; and as Professor Reichman noted, the inclusion of intellectual property rights in
GATT and NAFTA is no panacea because another set of questions
will remain to be addressed as technologies develop and as forms
of intellectual property change.

